Postponement of the Jewish Congress
THE vitality of the American Jewish Congress is effectively demonstrated by the reception given the decision to postpone it. Before the Congress elections on June 10th, impatient friends of the movement were convinced that death had overtaken it. When the votes were counted, they were agreeably surprised; over 340,000 ballots were cast; a dead movement would not have aroused such a tremendous interest. When the Congress was postponed from September 2nd to November 18th, loud lamentations and fervid denunciations in the Yiddish press again settled its fate; for the second time the Congress died. But the discussions and denunciations, the general fuss that was created, forced the Congress again to the forefront, and it was apparent that a movement that aroused so much strong feeling could not so easily be killed off. So it has been for the past two years; whenever a decision contrary to the popular impatient view was made, the men of little faith and patience, with tears streaming down their cheeks, made all their preparations to attend the funeral of the Congress. But the funeral has not taken place to this day.
The last postponement found Jewish public opinion a little more rational, a little less hysterical and with more self-confidence. The sworn defenders of the integrity of the Congress have not neglected spreading sentiments of pessimism, but the large mass of enlightened public opinion is not depressed. A surprisingly large number of men and women whose interest in the Congress cannot be questioned have expressed their unbiased judgment in favor of the postponement. They seem to be much relieved that the Congress will not be held on November 18th in the midst of liberal loan campaigns, military preparations, local elections and general national excitement. The postponement itself has evoked expressions of loyalty to the Congress from circles whose loyalty had been in doubt.
The history of the Congress movement is a record of progressive education. All the pangs of a new birth have been experienced in its organization. The delays, the hesitations, the many adjustments of partisan differences have created it. Out of the confusion comes light and leading. The bare idea of two years ago, which came as a response to the demand for immediate action, would not, if realized then, have produced the revolution in Jewish life, which is expressed by the Congress movement. Education was essential, and the progress of education is gradual and cannot be forced. It has taken all of these two or three years to bring about an appreciation of the implications of a democratic Jewish Congress. When the Zionists first promulgated the idea, it was only half understood. The slogan was, the organization of the Jews of America for the protection of all Jewish interests. Very few of the original Congressists had the patience or the farsight to wait for this idea to percolate through the minds of the Jews of this country.
The zigzag progress of the movement may be attributed to the lack of understanding of its underlying idea. The majority was so intent upon having an immediate public demonstration that they overlooked the more lasting benefits to be derived from an organized American Jewry. They pressed for action. The essence of the Congress was its absolute freedom. This freedom the demonstrators were willing to give up in order that a
loud demand might be registered. Under the pressure of Jewish "pacificism"—there is no other good word for it—the idea of a free Congress was abandoned, and a Congress by agreement was set up.
But the education of the Jewish people could not be suppressed. The compromise was not satisfactory. It brought home to thousands the lesson of democracy, for when democracy is outraged, the reaction comes with a vengeance. The dissatisfaction was due, in large measure, to the belated realization on the part of many who had not thought much of democratic processes that a great sacrifice had been made. The free Congress had been given up for the sake of immediate demonstration and a so-called unity. This rankled. Agitation could not have accomplished one-quarter as much for the spread of democratic sentiments as did the compromise agreement. It came too late, however, for any retreat, and the Congress elections were hurriedly decided upon and held. This haste was due to the fear that a factitious unity might dissolve if held too long. The nominations, the elections, and the party strife made clear the fact that the controversy raged about a Congress, which, if it was to be effective, would sooner or later be compelled to modify the Congress agreement. This produced the reaction. Thousands who came into the limited Congress were convinced that only a Congress that was free to frame its own program could adequately meet the situation.
Whatever the program of the Congress, it was clear that the liberating thought had been expressed in the fact that the Jews of America had been called upon to elect their representatives, and that notwithstanding the peace agreement, the Congress would have to express the fundamental idea involved in the Congress as first proposed, which was, that the Jews of America, for their own protection, interests and development had to take control of their affairs into their own hands. The peace agreement might limit their action, but the exercise of freedom even in a limited degree would necessarily, by common consent, soon result in the unhindered expression of Jewish democracy.
With the rules of election fixed, with the full quota of delegates elected, with all organizations bound to abide by the decision of the majority in the Congress, the Congress had been established. No delays could destroy it.
The writer was one of those who believed the Congress should be held on the date fixed, November 18th. He felt that, from a moral point of view, the future of the Congress should be placed in the hands of the delegates to the Congress. Whatever arguments might be advanced against possible exhibitions detrimental to Jewish interests should be lodged with the Congress delegates, for them to decide what to do under the circumstances. The fears of pacifism could be dealt with only by the Congress, which by its action would destroy the exaggerated notions that prevail as to the extent of pacificism among the Jewish masses. The Congress would show where organized American Jewry stood. No anti-Semetic propaganda could then utilize isolated facts of pacificism against the credit of the Jews. Further, the delegates could devote themselves to the internal organization of the Congress, and place a committee in charge of Jewish affairs, so that the power and authority of the Congress could be exercised by its


