The Maccabaean

French Diplomacy and the French Democracy

PALESTINE, the official organ of the British Palestine Committee, is of the opinion that in their general attitude, the French representatives at the Peace Conference do not represent the feelings and views of the French people. Palestine is of the opinion that with regard to the disposition of the Holy Land especially, the French diplomats have not shown any deep understanding and that their actions, if put to the test, would be repudiated by the French Democracy. After discussing the inherent vices of the diplomatic tradition in general, the writer concludes:

It would be idle to deny that the attitude of the French Foreign Office has made an unfavorable impression upon the bulk of the delegates assembled. The English Press is exceedingly reticent, but anybody who comes in contact with British journalists or British officials, whose duties have brought them to Paris, knows that the feeling is strong. The American Press gives freer rein to its feelings, which are even stronger. One cannot resist the conclusion that French diplomacy during these months has not been a good friend to France, and the French Press has emphasised, instead of correcting, the errors of French diplomacy.

An illustration of the ignorance of French diplomacy may be given from the French official attitude towards a Jewish Palestine. More than two years ago the French Government approved the British Government's Declaration in favour of a Jewish national home in Palestine, but throughout the Peace Conference the Jewish national cause has had neither sympathy nor assistance from diplomatic France. The explanation is not only that the French Foreign Office has given ear to certain influences, but also that it has never appreciated the power of the Jewish national idea over the Jewish people, and, consequently, the bearing of the Jewish national idea upon international relations in general. The result of this lack of knowledge has been to render it very difficult for Jews throughout the world to sustain at its old temperature their affection and their admiration for France. The mistake of the French Foreign Office has been all the worse because it is gratuitous. A real understanding should have taught French diplomacy that opposition to a British mandate for a Jewish Palestine must fail, so that the policy which dictated such opposition could only be a policy of loss without any compensating gain.

The consolation of the friends of France is that the French nation is not to be confounded with the French Foreign Office. The French nation has in as highly developed form as any other people an instinct for justice and for international comradeship, and rejects the fatal delusion that a world of nations is, and must always be, a jungle of wild beasts. An appeal to the ideals and traditions of the French masses should never be vain. Not Pichon is the true spokesman of France, but Anatole France, who hails "Zion reborn after so many centuries, and the scattered tribes of Israel once again gathered together."

The Strategic Eastern Border

A great deal of ignorance and vagueness has been in evidence as to what should be the eastern border of a Jewish Palestine. Referring to the fact that the disturbances in Egypt were largely the work of Bedouin marauders, Palestine, organ of the British Palestine Committee, draws certain cogent conclusions on the question of the eastern border of Palestine. The problem of that border according to Palestine is to check Bedouin inroads. The same problem, it seems, existed even in Roman times. The Romans solved this problem by an elaborate organization of the frontier. "Chains of posts fringed the desert as far south as Akabah and as far north as Damascus and the Euphrates." The problem today must be met in substantially the same way except that, since the disparity between the offensive power of the Bedouin and the defensive power of the Roman was much less than it would be as between the Bedouin and the Jew, the problem is greatly simplified. Says Palestine:

The possibility of a revived Jewish civilisation east of the Jordan depends upon a sound system of frontier defence, which will hold out the marauding nomad and allow labour to produce and enjoy the fruits of its toil. As our readers know, the Jewish people are asking for an eastern frontier extending up to, but not including, the Hedjaz railway. That is not the natural frontier, for the natural frontier on the east of Palestine extends to the desert. It is not the strategical frontier, for it leaves a flank of maximum width open to the nomad of the desert. The Jews have asked for this artificial frontier wholly out of deference to the Arabs. They hope and believe that one day the Arab State which the Peace Conference is expected to set up will acquire strength and stability to curb the marauder and the plunderer from the desert, who will be as great a danger to the Arab State as to a Jewish Palestine. But this depends upon a variety of contingencies, for example, the conditions under which the Arab State comes into existence. In any event it must take many years before the Arab State will be the strong bulwark on the east of Palestine which all hope it will ultimately be. But the needs of adequate frontier defence for Palestine are urgent and immediate. The necessity for making a Jewish Palestine in Trans-Jordania exists today. Therefore, the need of a frontier strategy exists today.

We have good reason for believing that these considerations have been in the minds of the military advisers of the British Delegation at Paris. A garrison will, of course, be needed, and there are available for this purpose a good many Jewish soldiers who have had training and experience during the war —the Jewish battalions and numerous volunteers whose services could be readily obtained. So far as manpower is concerned, the frontier defence of Palestine need make little if any call upon these islands (The British), a consideration of no little import ance in these days. We may therefore lay down as the first principle of a politically sound frontier defence strategy of Palestine that it should make the fullest possible use of trained Jewish soldiers, whether trained in the British army or trained in some other army, so long as their devotion to Palestine is beyond question.

What Shall Be the Fate of Damascus and Aleppo?

In its issue of April 19th the official organ of the British Palestine Committee makes a plea for the inclusion of Damascus and Aleppo within the Hedjas kingdom. The occasion for this plea is the report that it had been "practically decided that France shall have Damascus and Aleppo."

A quick settlement is necessary in the East, but a just settlement is even more necessary. The boundaries must be determined according to principle—the principles which the Allies profess. As our readers will have gathered, there is very considerable danger lest this settlement may reflect not principles but appetites.

Referring to the reports regarding the disposition of Damascus, Aleppo and Alexandretta, the organ of the British Palestine Committee continues:

If these assertions be correct, they are of considerable importance. Without Damascus and Aleppo the Arab State of the Emir Feisal becomes so shrunken that it can have no vitality of its own, and no future. It is possible that the French might suggest that he should compensate himself in Trans-Jordania at the expense of a Jewish Palestine. But, apart from the fact that it is not conceivable that the British Government should lend itself to a transaction which would strangle a Jewish Palestine as well as an Arab Syria, there would be in such a deal no compensation. Damascus, as its history and its geographical situation indicate, is unique politically and commercially. If the Arab State were to lose Damascus, it would be shut off from Syria and thrown back upon the desert.